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Bombs, Bodies, Acts

The Banalization of Suicide

ENGİN F. ISIN AND MELISSA L. FINN

We try retrospectively to impose some kind of meaning on it, to find some kind of interpretation. But there is none. And it is the radicality of the spectacle, which alone is original and irreducible.

Jean Baudrillard¹

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Note 1

Two and a half decades ago, it would have been fanciful to imagine; men and women ramming into targets and blowing themselves and all else around them into bits with bombs strapped to their bodies or vehicles. It would have been even more difficult to imagine that such acts would become everyday occurrences in places as geographically separated and culturally diverse as Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Colombo, Grozny, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Kabul, Karachi, London, Madrid, Moscow, New York, and St. Petersburg. Then, the radicality of these acts of suicide violence was their original and irreducible character, as Baudrillard saw, which gave life and death new meanings.² Now, the acts are no longer unexpected, unpredictable, or original, but rather routinized, ritualized, and mimetic practices. If Albert Camus thought suicide was the only serious philosophical problem, what would he have thought of banalized suicide violence?³

The literature on suicide violence appears clustered around two diametrically opposed positions. On the one hand suicide violence appears as an absolute evil, and on the other as an absolute good. What theoretical resources are available to us to interpret suicide violence as acts without condemning them as absolute evil (thus refusing to recognize the grounds on which suicide violence became possible, even justifiable) or as absolute good (thus participating in their senselessness)? It is obvious to us that it is irresponsible to refuse to see the conditions under which suicide bombings are justified and then condemn them as evil acts. Yet, it becomes complicity to recognize the conditions and say the acts, in their succession, are justifiable self-defense when the self-defense itself enacts the very oppression it laments. While remaining sensitively aware of the grounds that make acts of suicide violence possible, we wish to explore how the once radical act of authenticity and originality

has been reduced to an act of imitation, and how it has been transformed into a routinized, ritualized, and mimetic practice. It is troubling that suicide bombings have become habitus (as Bourdieu understood that concept as a relatively enduring and socially produced disposition through instituted and repetitive practices in specific fields such as war, media, politics, and art).⁴ That suicide violence has become habitus increasingly renders it both unquestioned and unquestionable while it is also both imagined and unimaginable. This mimetic logic continually produces a compulsion for repetition, which, in turn, creates a neurosis of the body politic and of the citizen through which the fear of repetition creates more repetition.⁵ We suggest that the “War on Terror” and suicide violence may have become two aspects of the same cycle of repetition that produces the neurotic citizen and suicide violence as both its cause and effect.

To an extent, things were easier for Camus than for us: he thought that suicide was a confession by those for whom life either was too much or was beyond understanding.⁶ Camus could not see suicide as revolt. For Camus, living was revolt. While revolt gives life its value, suicide escapes it. Can we follow Camus to refuse suicide violence as revolt? Things were indeed much easier for Camus. From Émile Durkheim to Camus, Western thought has always individualized suicide, seeing it as the act of a singular individual.⁷ In fact, as Slavoj Žižek observed, for both Durkheim and Camus “suicide becomes an *existential* act, the outcome of a pure decision, irreducible to objective suffering or psychic pathology.”⁸ While suicide violence always involves the act of an individual, it is much more complicated by the fact that by being resolutely directed toward and involving the other, it produces a new figure—the soldier-martyr—as the actor. This new figure is simultaneously a warrior against oppression, injustice, and abjection *and* a weapon.

While suicide violence has been justified as the weapon of the weak and the only means available to actors who lack advanced tactical weaponry to resist domination, oppression, injustice, and abjection, the banalization of such acts is revealed in the transformation of means into ends and in the transformation from the act to an everyday practice. The banal effects of this violence can be seen not only in its systematization, routinization, rationalization, and ritualization among potential new actors, but also in the modern-day soldier-martyr who remains (or who seems to remain) calmly detached when carrying out these acts—acts that seem to target combatant and noncombatant populations with the same kind of virulence and indifference and in fact erase the difference between the two. The banalization of suicide is tied to the normalization of violence and the senseless destruction of life. The ultimate act of sacrifice is no longer only for the brave, but also for people who, by way of heedless or reactionary or disciplined acts, snuff out themselves and others.

We use the term “banalization” here as an adjective to describe the effects and affects of suicide violence; the terms “banalization” or “banality” are employed not to trivialize the grounds of the act, the suffering of those who are caught in the act (which includes both victims and the perpetrators), or the act itself (or, worse, to reify suicide violence along Orientalist lines). The social and political conditions that produce suicide violence are real to those who experience its effects on the ground. We draw our inspiration from Hannah Arendt’s brave use of the term.⁹ Arendt treated banality as the complete lack of imagination of an actor who followed evil orders. The actor is a cog in the war machine built by the Nazis. What we wish to discuss in this chapter is not “banality of evil” but “banalization of acts.” We use “banalization” to refer to the increasing predictability, cliché, and prosaicism of suicide violence in the world. While we wish to recognize the grounds on which acts of suicide violence against life may become justifiable (domination, oppression, injustice, and abjection), we also insist that their transformation from acts into ongoing practices that produces habitus erodes their legitimacy.¹⁰

The long-running debate over violence and politics in social and political thought involved illustrious scholars.¹¹ Franz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Carl Schmitt, Georges Sorel, and Max Weber, despite their differences, tended to recognize violence as both justifiable and legitimate foundation of a body politic.¹² By contrast, Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, and Jacques Derrida were much more ambivalent about the equivalence between justification and legitimization of violence.¹³ Arendt expressed this crucial distinction well. She insisted that while those who have been subjected to abject conditions and injustice may well be justified in using violence against their oppressors, violence itself could not be considered a legitimate foundation of a body politic. She was aware that “under certain circumstances violence—acting without argument or speech and without counting the consequences—is the only way to set the scales of justice right again.”¹⁴ Moreover, while Arendt insisted on seeing violence as antipolitical she rejected interpreting acts of violence as emotional or rational.¹⁵ Yet, for Arendt, violence against injustice, however justifiable, when it is rationalized becomes irrational.¹⁶ It has been recognized that much of modern-day suicide violence is not generated by irrational or emotional yearnings that are intrinsic to the cultures or religions from which they spring. But that does not mean that suicide violence is inherently rational either. Rather, suicide violence that *becomes* rationalized and banalized becomes irrational. The banalization of suicide is the repetition that reveals rationalizations, especially with regard to noncombatant life. While we do not aim to engage with this literature on violence, we draw upon it to conclude that in understanding suicide violence as political acts, there must be a necessary differentiation between justification and legitimacy.

Understanding Acts of Suicide Violence

Much has already been said about suicide violence—we feel perhaps too much. Nonetheless, there have been useful (and necessary) classifications, histories, documents, ethnographies, and accounts of both acts and actors.¹⁷ But do we *understand* suicide violence? Arendt makes a useful distinction between knowledge and understanding. She says knowledge makes words into weapons. Knowledge becomes less interested in understanding than in having correct information and classification.¹⁸ Knowledge aims to develop unequivocal results, judges with certainty, and aims to intervene with effectiveness. By contrast, understanding “is an unending activity by which, in constant change and variation, we come to terms with and reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world.”¹⁹ We aim to understand suicide violence as acts that become practices and then *habitus*.²⁰

We appreciate the ambiguous, open-ended, and nonessential nature of act and being to avoid reproducing dominant representations of acts of suicide violence.²¹ The fundamental difficulty about discussing suicide violence is that we are attempting to make sense of its senselessness. To recognize its senselessness is not to condemn the grounds (domination, oppression, injustice, and abjection) on which violent acts can become possible and justifiable. Any interpretation of the meaning of acts of suicide violence risks closing off alternative understandings of the actor and the act; the choice of silence becomes implicated in problems of ethics, fairness, and integrity.²² The starting point, then, is to recognize, as Esslin eloquently puts it, the “illusoriness and absurdity of ready-made solutions and prefabricated meanings.”²³

With regard to the *aporia* of understanding phenomena such as suicide violence, we can now mention several caveats. While we recognize the insightful and ethical approach taken by Mikhail Bakhtin and others on representation, we also recognize that even the subtitle of this chapter, “banalization of suicide,” already begins to represent suicide violence as banalized, thus moving us away from the pure Bakhtinian ethics. Representation is unavoidable. Bakhtin moreover argues that aestheticizing, historicizing, and abstracting acts force a split between the substance of the act, the individual experience of it, and the event as it unfolds.²⁴ In anticipation of concerns that may be raised with regard to historicizing, abstracting, and ethics, we would suggest the following.

First, there is an important difference between representing an act as an object of knowledge and understanding it. It is indeed clear that suicide violence should not be immediately categorized, reified, and represented because in doing so we try to contain it and seal off what the act (and the actor) can and cannot be (according to our own arbitrary specifications). The experience of those who are caught in the act is incalculably more profound than any observer’s understanding or witnessing of it. Second, in order to under-

stand the act of suicide violence, we must recognize its historical and political grounds. Suicide violence must be contextualized within the system of power relations and domination, oppression, injustice, and abjection that compel actors to enact acts of death. Third, regarding the problem of abstraction, while it may seem that we abstract suicide violence by saying that it is banalized, we are not referring to the acts of suicide violence, but rather to the way in which the succession and series of acts are transformed into everyday practices. *It is the succession and repetition that banalize the act, thereby transforming it from an act into a practice, routine, and eventually habitus.* Fourth, regarding the problem of capturing an event as it is unfolding and possibly diminishing the interplay that occurs between an actor's processes of development and self-understanding, and his or her capacity to change, we would say that Bakhtin's analysis confronts a challenge when suicide violence is analyzed because, if successful, the actor actually commits to death and dies.²⁵ The act of suicide violence is like no other act. It is not like the act of commanding because when people command, they are still alive and are evolving and changing.²⁶ With suicide violence, however, there is the problem of the suicide at which point the actor ceases to be, ceases to be in flux, and ceases to exist as a body. We are dealing with an act that not only effaces itself but also is aimed at the effacement of the other. Arendt would say that the originality of acts of suicide violence is horrible, not because they are new but because they constitute a rupture with our understanding; these acts explode the categories of political thought and standards of judgment.²⁷

Freedom and Responsibility

We shall emphasize the three elements of the act: actor, freedom, and responsibility. Although state occupation creates the conditions for suicide violence (domination, oppression, injustice, and abjection), actors are still radically responsible for rendering acts of suicide violence. Yet, there are problems related to the contingencies of *facticity* and the problem of the *alibi*, the former referring to the nature of the constraints on the actor and the latter referring to the kinds of excuses used by actors to abdicate responsibility. So the questions of freedom and responsibility of actors get entangled with questions of facticity and alibi.

The Question of Facticity

Jean-Paul Sartre argues that acts shape the world, which suggests an orientation of means and ends, and a fundamental and inextricable linkage to the Other. Sartre always insisted that no contingency or fact could be a cause over or determine action; the being orients itself freely from a state of existence to one that has yet to unfold. There is a cause for all acts, and yet, the act is still oriented intentionally toward a future as-not-yet-realized. The nature of the act is not already determined or constituted, but is rather commanded by

the life of the being which is constantly oriented toward its potentiality. The project of being-in-the-world always involves choice. The being is constrained by contingencies that develop out of the choices it has made; the potentiality of some future path is made concrete as it unfolds. *Since beings can refer to no one as having already constituted the future path, they are radically responsible for the act and that which springs from the act.* In every instance, the subject must fashion his criterion for action because, according to Sartre, there is no universal code for action or categorical imperative that can render such acts justifiable. To say that a categorical imperative exists is to fall back on a false projection (to project oneself in the name of a universal law of conduct).²⁸

The implications for acts of suicide violence are as follows: the soldier-martyr is a free actor, to the extent that he or she may make choices, and may establish a particular motive and an end goal for which radically responsibility is established. The soldier-martyr makes himself and is constituted within each moment of enactment (which ultimately ends with death). The moment the soldier-martyr enacts himself, the moment the soldier-martyr has realized his goal of self-annihilation and -immolation as responsive action and political message, he is no longer able to stand accountable and responsible for his acts. This invariably creates a problem for the being who is responsible for the deaths of the victims but who can no longer stand to be judged for the act. There is, moreover, the problem of how each enactment of suicide violence increases the attractiveness of the act as a form of responsive action because of the impression and desire it leaves in the mind of another to do the same. Thus, as Emmanuel Lévinas points out, it is of irreducible significance that our responsibility for the death of the Other invariably puts an ethic upon us (and we are equally responsible for the host of other actors who see our original acts as precedent and inspiration to act similarly).²⁹ In other words, soldier-martyrs, like all actors, are implicated in the consequences of their acts and the way those consequences affect others.

Now, it is “radical” rather than “absolute” responsibility that is enjoined upon acting beings. The actor’s responsibility is not absolute because all beings are constrained by various forms of facticity such as *place*, *past*, *environment*, *relational Other*, and *death* that cannot be changed by free will. According to Sartre, beings insert “action into the network of determinism.”³⁰ The *place* consists of that which is manifested to the being (the location of birth, the place of relations); where someone is born constrains choice and opens up other opportunities. Thus, the soldier-martyr may face limited choices by being born in a violent society, but his birthplace does not *cause* the actor to decide to self-annihilate.³¹ There are many people in similar conditions who do not choose this path in life. The *past* of the actor includes any previous choices made that cannot be undone, but the past does not determine the future, nor does it direct the actor *irrevocably* toward a future decision to self-annihilate. As for the *environment*, the field of action is always conducted through a con-

figuration of objects (certain immovable or movable objects, buildings, sets of infrastructure, natural settings, etc.) that are placed and unplaced and that are wholly indifferent and undecided by the actor. The actor is, however, free and responsible in a situation despite the “unpredictability and the adversity of the environment.”³² The *relational Other* is a contingent fact that is existent and discovered in every choice in life. Beings are free (despite the givenness of the Other who has not come into the world through them) to apprehend the Other as subject or object, as real or abstracted. While the actor cannot necessarily decide what the Other will do or do to him, he is radically responsible for his action as it becomes implicated in the life of the Other. The last kind of facticity described by Sartre is *death*. The being, despite the inevitability and finitude of death, can direct his project toward or in spite of death, and he can realize and actualize his own freedom-to-die; the being enjoys a totality of “free choice of finitude.”³³ But death does not necessarily mean finitude to the soldier-martyr. The soldier-martyr acts toward death, motivated not necessarily by its finality, but by the belief that such acts are worthy of reward in an afterlife. It is possible therefore that the soldier-martyr may actualize his own “freedom-to-die” as a free choice while denying the finality of death. The soldier-martyr ruptures death as facticity (as a constraint to his realm of choices).

There are contradictions of banality vis-à-vis the question of death in modern suicide violence. On the one hand, the soldier-martyr projects himself freely toward a “final possibility” in death and, in so doing, actualizes the authentic existence, one that is pruned away from the banalization of the ordinary and attains “the irreplaceable uniqueness” of itself.³⁴ On the other hand, the increasingly common and increasingly ordinary character of these acts substantially undermines their “irreplaceable uniqueness,” the legitimacy and honor of an authentic life and projected death. It has become the once ultimate act of authenticity degraded down to repetition and mimesis. It is an act of followers and no longer of leaders. The lamb is not unique, and its slaughter is like a thousand others. Moreover, the choice of death robs the life and situation of its meaning and sacrality, while the problems that the act was meant to address remain unresolved. The choice to escape the ineffable of one’s facticity (the presence and imposition of place, past, environment, relational others, and future death) through death is weakness, for alternative solutions to the life were not acted upon. In Sartre’s words,

Suicide is an absurdity which causes my life to be submerged in the absurd. . . . Death [nihilation] is not only the project which destroys all projects and which destroys itself. . . . It is also the triumph of the point of view of the Other over the point of view which I am toward myself.³⁵

The concept of radical responsibility is deflated by claims that actors are limited by ignorance and error. This reminds us of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, both of whom emphasized that acts are rational despite the ignorance

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and error of the actors that arise from their inadequate or incorrect knowledge of the conditions or situations of their acts.³⁶ Moreover, they argue, so long as acts are rational, they involve responsibility. Such thinking tends to deflate the freedom and responsibility enjoined upon acting beings, including soldier-martyrs. Action can be, however, motivated by a real or perceived injustice that renders violence by annihilation a desirable response. Arendt writes that engagement is transformed into enagement not necessarily because of injustice, but rather hypocrisy. Here the suicide violence is understandable: the soldier-martyr desires

[t]o tear the mask of hypocrisy from the face of the enemy, to unmask him and the devious machinations and manipulations that permit him to rule . . . to provoke action even at the risk of annihilation so that the truth may come out.³⁷

It is for this reason that Arendt thinks violence can be justified.³⁸

With regard to freedom, and the relations of the actor with outside collectivities, this much is possible: it is possible that some forms of indoctrination, community norms and expectations, and propaganda wield considerable power and influence in creating conditions that foster or support suicide violence as a response (e.g., encouraging the soldier-martyr to act), or, on the flip side, that stymie debate or suppress legitimate political grievances.³⁹ It is possible that an individual, group, or people, when faced with premeditated mass murder, terrorization, or torture of the people they identify with, can become temporarily unreasonable by projecting their problems on substitute others. On the other hand, again, freedom and responsibility are undermined when excuses are made and action is blamed on the influence of collectivities; despite the facticity of the relations of a collectivity to an actor, the soldier-martyr still acts freely with tenacity, virulence, and indifference toward combatants and noncombatants. Violent or hostile reactions are not, moreover, *necessarily and simply* caused by oppression; instead, some violence is fueled by the ego, delusion, and a “sense of impotence.”⁴⁰ Acts of suicide violence against human life are acts that attempt to overcome an enemy or an object. Writing along similar lines, Bakhtin argued that “[a]n indifferent and hostile reaction is always a reaction that impoverishes and decomposes its object: it seeks to pass over the object in all its manifoldness, to ignore it or to overcome it.”⁴¹

The Problem of the Alibi

An act, if it is to be an act, must rupture facticity as a limit on action; an act must rupture the need to present an alibi. If one understands an actor (or, equally as important, if the actor understands himself) as operating as a secret representative for some cause, for religion, or for God, one turns the actor (or he turns himself) into an imposter or pretender. In principle, a claim to alibi is a claim to avoid responsibility, a claim to avoid an act of one’s own choosing.

What we are *enacting* here is a refusal to think of the being as severed from his ontological roots in personal participation (the ongoing event of Being) because who the actor is is inextricably associated with the kinds of acts he enacts. The choice of the soldier-martyr to participate in and carry out an act of suicide violence through death to self and others is ontologically grounded in the act, its consequences, and the being itself.

Actors often employ euphemisms regarding war and violence as alibis. Euphemisms give the impression that an act was carried out under the auspices of a more benign or legitimate purpose than is possible given the nature of such attacks. Euphemisms for war, violence, terrorism, extermination, liquidation, and killing such as “evacuations,” “surgical strikes,” and “martyrdom” operations are important linguistic choices, indications perhaps of either an evasion of responsibility through the invocation of an alibi, or an easing of the conscience.⁴² The use of “war” as an excuse (an alibi about which) to do violence against innocent people not only is inexcusable⁴³ but also calls the legitimacy of the act into question.

In this discussion of facticity, freedom, responsibility, and alibi, what we are driving toward is the answerability of the actor: the ability of the actor to answer for the content of the act and the being who enacts it in a succession of moments in the Being-as-event, to bring the act and the Being into communication.⁴⁴ The *answerable act* is the act that does not claim an alibi to evade responsibility;⁴⁵ it is an act that is answerably aware of itself.⁴⁶ Actors who invoke an alibi often invoke a universal ethic (a categorical imperative); they take shelter, so to speak, under a universal principle that is said to justify the act. Bakhtin writes, “The principle of formal [Kantian] ethics moreover is not the principle of an actually performed act at all, but is rather the principle of the possible generalization of already performed acts in a theoretical transcription of them.”⁴⁷ Sartre concurs in a slightly different way by arguing that the Kantian ethical system substitutes doing (action) for being (actor) as the most important aspect of the act.⁴⁸ Sartre and Bakhtin are emphasizing an ethics of being: the unfolding event of Being and act cannot be predetermined, assumed into a generality, and therefore theorized upon from this perspective.

The answerable act is the fulfillment of a decision to act. The answerable act is accountable, other oriented, and answerably aware of itself. Thus the act of suicide violence, in its annihilation of the actor and its claims of justification vis-à-vis an ideology or movement, is not an answerably aware act. By its very nature, suicide violence annihilates the actor and its answerability. The actor cannot stand to account for the act, and the act ceases to be. The act is not answerable if the actor obeys orders because of indoctrination or if military discipline is used as an alibi. The actor—in our case, the soldier-martyr—knows what he is doing; he is responsible for the act. Being unable to answer for it, however, in the Bakhtinian sense (because of death) does not

mean that the actor is released from the act and therefore need not account for the act.

The Prosaicism of Suicide

The concept of the act involves an effort to change some aspect of the world, a set of means orientated toward some kind of end, and an implicit serial connectedness of action such that changes effected by one act will affect a subsequent act, thereby producing a desired goal.⁴⁹ Arendt wrote in *On Violence* that violence is a form of instrumental means whose ends condition the thought and action of people and therefore require guidance and justification.⁵⁰ Acts of suicide violence aim to question and unsettle domination, oppression, injustice, and abjection. Violence is predicated on a mean-ends evaluation, and violent actors are always faced with the possibility that their means may overwhelm their ends.⁵¹

When means are evaluated in relation to ends or an end goal, it is often said that the end justified the means. In talk of means and ends, one can look at the ways, in current times, that suicide violence has been rendered fashionable. It ensures the continued glorification of the actor as hero and the act as a statement of authentic bravery. As acts of violence, suicide violence employs volunteerism, self-annihilation and -immolation, and killing as means to achieve an end that places value and importance on the desired end of emancipation. Taken from this, we want to examine the ways in which “war theaters” have ushered in a new kind of means-ends dichotomy that has transformed the means into the end in itself and thus made them routinized and habitual practices.

One can see the banalization of suicide violence unfolding through a means-turned-ends shift: the killing, the carnage, becomes an end in itself; and the method of delivering a violent message is the end in banalized violence. Acts of suicide violence may have originated on justified grounds of domination, oppression, injustice, and abjection. However, when the act of suicide violence became an everyday enactment, it appeared that perspectives changed (or perhaps many lost their perspective), that it was no longer horrible to kill human beings indiscriminately, and in fact that was often the goal. The original purposes of the goal, a struggle for emancipation or resistance, somehow get lost or clouded by a succession of violent acts that employ bloodshed as a tool of negotiation. We are reminded here of Friedrich Nietzsche’s caution that just because a thing comes into being for a purpose does not mean that it always serves that purpose.⁵² When the means become ends in the context of a “war theater,” that “theater” becomes absurd, robbed of its purpose, its originary goals, and its political roots; it becomes, as it were, a symbol of senseless life senselessly taking life. It is an irremediable exile from being human, a deprivation of one’s relation with the Other.⁵³

A violent act has the capacity to make us aware of a grievance, but there is always the danger that violence will move unconsciously in ways that over-

whelm the goals and in directions that reproduce and reinforce the conditions of its grievance.⁵⁴ The contemporary crisis, writes Bakhtin, is that there is often an abyss between the actual motivation for an act and its end; the end makes indeterminate (it is walled off from) the actual motivation for the act.⁵⁵ Thus, the means-turned-end shift signals two things: first, the original motivations of emancipation or martyrdom are severed, because of the killing that becomes the end, from any form of liberation that inevitably results. This is clearly the case because the end no longer exists when the banalized repetition of means (the act of killing as means) appears to replace the end as the goal. Second, the original motivations of emancipation and martyrdom are lost in the serially recurrent acts of bodies and bits that not only are prosaic and cliché-like, but also have been robbed of their uniqueness and their honor. Modern soldier-martyrs believe that they carry an impressive or legitimate message, but such fantasies are not revealed through their deaths.

In addition to the shift toward calculability, the banalization of suicide is revealed in the concurrent streams of attacks that are being perpetrated on a daily basis. Suicide violence has become everyday. Suicide violence acts have become practices. Such practices are unimaginative, predictable, and inane, though this in no way trivializes their effects or affects. One can experience firsthand, or read and hear about, an act of suicide violence in which large numbers of civilians are maimed or killed. Suicide violence is so routinized that bombers have been woven into the daily functioning of people in and outside of war or occupation; it is part of a global experiential montage. On the news, suicide violence no longer shocks the sensibilities of people. The day of suicide attacks, of yesterday or today or tomorrow, is “heavy and dangerous,” and with each passing milestone, we, as a global collective, are weary because the “calamity of yesterday” has changed who we are.⁵⁶ And yet, as Esslin argues, “the more things change, the more they are the same”; the tears of the world are its terrible stability.⁵⁷ The repetitive sameness of moving time is what violence produces in its banalized succession. The banalization of suicide violence is also evidenced in the rising rates of volunteerism for martyrdom operations or missions. More and more people are not only becoming but also *choosing* to become part of the banalized repetition of day in and day out annihilating bodies. This certainly raises serious questions about the gloriousness of a mission when it is like a thousand others. There is, moreover, a degree of banality, cliché, and superficiality in the soldier-martyr’s formulaic approach to entering heaven.⁵⁸

It is the everydayness of mimetic murders, wanton vigilantism, and vengeance that is banalizing the acts of suicide violence and their effects. Justice is lost when a single human being, a single soldier-martyr, can arbitrarily render his verdict on the guilty-as-imagined as judge, jury, and executioner. The everydayness of suicide violence and their effects are robbing people of a sacred appreciation of the soul and twisting the divine purpose of martyr-

dom, which has always been to defend family and home, not strike a people because they attend a different religious center.

Actor and the Face of the Other

Acts of suicide violence are, unequivocally, acts of violence against the face or being of another. The soldier-martyr does not see the face of the Other. Rather, he sees the Other as a force or barbarity that must be overcome.⁵⁹ The face, however, “opposes violence with metaphysical resistance” and forces the subject to accept responsibility;⁶⁰ the existence of the metaphysical face of the Other is the existence of a covenant between human beings.⁶¹ The soldier-martyr strikes instead with the calculation that he will no longer be alive to bear his own suffering or the suffering of his victims. It is a calculation that unsuccessfully attempts to physically, psychologically, and metaphysically erase the face of the Other from sympathy, empathy, consciousness, and memory. Of course, the inevitably futile attempt to erase the face of the Other is meant to ease existential angst about killing and deny the sacred connectedness shared by human beings. The sacred connectedness of human beings is described by Esslin as the ability to recognize and admit that we are the Other and the Other is us.⁶²

Acts of suicide violence appear to treat Otherness as fixed and incapable of changing; the Other is portrayed as an inherent or inescapable enemy. It is therefore not only perfectly acceptable to terrorize and murder them, but also such acts close off who the Other is and how and if he can transform; it suggests that people can slip into Otherness but hardly ever slip out of it.⁶³ Using clichés such as “faceless enemy,” moreover, is the feeble attempt of violent actors to render nontransformative the capacity of the Other to be other than expected. Agathangelou and Ling mention that the Other is often targeted as the cause of violence and destruction; the self often constructs itself as “innocent, victimized, moral, and rational,” and the Other as “demonic, murderous, and radically barbaric.” Militarization is therefore regarded as a moral imperative.⁶⁴

For Lévinas, ethics is the ethics of the Other. An ethics with respect to the face of the Other is perhaps encapsulated in the phrase “human qua Other” (human in the capacity of the Other); it is an imaginary substitution: the ability of the self to substitute itself for the other (e.g., to know that we are the Other and the Other is us).⁶⁵ Here, it is important to point out that there is a difference between substitution and the substitute Other, however connected the concepts may be. Substitution is identification, to be in the capacity of the Other; the substitute is the person for whom anger is wrongly directed. The ethical act not only is the choice of the actor to substitute himself for the Other, but also ensures that anger is not directed against substitutes. Sigmund Freud spoke about the theme of wrongly directed anger when he said that sometimes people seek to exact punishment for a crime committed even if it

does not fall on the guilty party.⁶⁶ Similarly, Arendt argued that rage and violence become irrational when they are directed against substitutes.⁶⁷ There is often a false sense of certainty attached to suicide violence such that the actor feels that the targets of his action are in some way guilty, but when innocent people are involved, his anger is usually directed at substitutes. Use of the term “self-defense” to justify attacks on substitute targets invariably becomes a tactic to impose limitless aggression, stymie questions about culpability and historical inquiry, and render retaliation as if it were always moral.

The banalization of suicide violence is further exposed through the judgments that are used to justify it. Many strict and literalistic forms of religious exotericism—and many soldier-martyrs are doctrinally exoteric—see order being maintained when people are coded, classified, and restrained.⁶⁸ The perceived crimes of a “lesser Other” are coded and classified such that it is a crime to be other than the soldier-martyr’s group, to not pick up arms against the occupier, and to fail to pray as often as is required by God (many widely accepted judgments about the Other tend to legitimize repetitive acts of violence against the Other). The disciplining effects of group surveillance over a population are a form of intimidation that determines with arbitrary exclusivity who is a criminal body and who is worthy of death or punishment. In most cases, criminality is what the Other does that does not accord to the religious, political, or nationalist expectations of the soldier-martyr’s group. We envisage social, political, and religious forms of surveillance, discipline, and correction between social groups as a kind of “panoptic judgment” (the panoptic overseeing of one group upon another produces arbitrary and wide-sweeping judgment, and the recipients of such judgment check their behavior when they feel they are being watched or when they feel they may be punished or harmed); this is not unlike Foucault’s notions of surveillance and discipline vis-à-vis the Panopticon. In order to self-annihilate and destroy innocent life, the soldier-martyr must treat the targets of his attack as if they are all guilty for some perceived crime. The purpose of panoptic judgment, like the Panopticon, is power: “to induce in the [moral, religious, or political Other] a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assumes the automatic functioning of power.”⁶⁹ In the panoptic view, the Other is abstracted and generalized, which renders this body an “easy target for contempt. Devoid of humanity, the abstract Other is outside of history, incapable of development, destined for servitude, and degraded to a valueless object.”⁷⁰ Like the imperial colonizers, modern-day state oppressors and soldier-martyrs who target noncombatants strive to embolden the perpetrator mentality which justifies the destructive machinery that robs humans of their humanness, their soul; it renders them “spiritless matter, raw material.”⁷¹

Acts to Habitus: The Banalization of Violence

The banalization of suicide violence is complete when the act is rationalized, systematized, routinized, and glorified. These are the other effects and affects of suicide violence. The fog of war is as dense for the soldier-martyr as it is for any state. Clarity of mind (the ability of the actor and the masses to gaze upon the effects of violence in their midst) is substantially reduced as time passes. It is not easy for a collective to step back from itself, from the acts of its people, and from the conditions on the ground in order to question whether their own complacency has allowed for the normalization of violence. The rationalization is always there that because the “act” cut right into the heart of a state oppressor, it was also morally and religiously permissible. Suicide violence is now habitus for anyone seeking vengeance or restitution; never mind God, religion, morality, ethics, or the sacrality of the human being. Suicide violence not only has been normalized and banalized, but so also have its effects and affects. Modern suicide violence becomes systematic, calculative, orderly, and murderous. In a systematic and calculative sense, soldier-martyrs calculate the incalculable benefits of martyrdom, imagining that the deed will tip the divine scales in their favor; in this calculation, the martyr gets immediate access to heaven and can put in a word for his next of kin as well. The figure of the soldier-martyr reproduces the militarism of the state against which it originated.

Current forms of suicide violence are also routine and commonplace. With each instance of suicide violence, the act (and its effects vis-à-vis detonated bomb, shrapnel, and body bits) becomes part of the routine of one’s day. Of course, the act is fueled by narratives of grandeur about the place of the martyr in heaven, which only serve to further glorify the act despite its most grievous effects vis-à-vis the carnage of human life. Actors who carry out acts of suicide violence peer over and attempt to control the masses through threats of punishment. Disloyalty is heavily punished. Suicide violence has therefore taken on its own actor; it is now the site of an apparatus of capture. The actor and the act are actually struggling for control over its effects and affect. At what point in this violent mechanism does the actor have to stop thinking, and the machine’s “artificial” intelligence take over? At what point does the act of suicide violence become the means, the ends, and the only remaining actor in the event as it unfolds? The bombers are dead or are dying; the only thing keeping this violent mechanism going is the act itself. Thus the act is no longer an act but habitus.

The banalization and normalization of suicide violence can also be witnessed in the way the act is transformed into a gesture, a pantomime of the imagination that no longer indicates creation and a will to act (uniquely), but rather the endurance and continued support of a status quo (locked in “the sphere of a pure and endless” mediocrity).⁷² The notion of gesture or pantomime suggests that the actor must divorce his humanity, on some level, from

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his act; the actor must step outside of himself to do the act. He must stage the action (the mime) by mimicking previous suicide attacks, all the while posing and presenting a lionhearted image to the world. Though few would doubt that it takes tenacity and bravery to plunge knowingly into death, the actors' act still contributes to the normalization of a violent status quo and the desensitization of the masses to violence. As spectator, victim, and perpetrator, it is intolerable and ineffable to us that human beings all over the world are being tortured, raped, hacked, macheted, and blown to bits, but we are desensitized to the ongoing event of violent Being and we tolerate it; violence has reached its banalized end, we are rarely shocked, and when we are, the effects are temporary and, more worryingly, just as routinized.⁷³ Moreover, few can ignore the way the pantomime unfolds in a social and cultural ritual. When we suggest that suicide violence is ritualized, we not only mean the act itself (recruitment, planning, training, recording, executing, and claiming) but also how the act is represented and imagined through cultural and social symbols that normalize it. In some cases, the suicide bomber becomes the "living martyr," the new Achilles of the object. In seeking a glorious death, the martyred is memorialized by his people. It is a habitus among the families of the martyred soldiers to name future children after their dead son or daughter. The notion of "replacement children," children regarded as replacing the soldier-martyr in life and mimicking in death, is a cultural and social and domestic practice of banalized suicide violence.

Is it any wonder that the "suicide bomber doll," as some commentators have called it, would make its appearance as a cultural symbol? In making and playing with this doll, a violent habitus is cultivated. It is a toy for the imagination emulating reality, and a toy for reality emulating the imagination, or imagined desires. However, the "suicide bomber doll" is not something conjured up in the imaginative boardrooms of America. Children do not play with the doll to escape their own harsh and abject conditions, but rather to face such conditions with defiance. In conditions of abjection, it reveals to young minds how transforming can bring emancipation and how the child can move from uncertainty to certainty about the world. The doll itself is a symbol of resistance, but what kind of resistance? To teach them that an honorable death is to die to kill the Other? It is a resistance banalized from its originary purposes. The unfortunate truth of the doll is that it no longer represents a glorious death, but now a banalized one.

Though his purpose was to disrupt a capitalist icon by fitting a bomb belt to her waist and equipping her with a detonator button, Simon Tyszkowski's agit-prop artwork, *The Suicide Bomber Barbie*, reveals how banalized violence has seeped into the collective imaginaries. The artist has identified a cultural icon, a cultural toy, one that is mimicked and adored for her sharp fashion sense, and is saying through his art, "See how Barbie is eyeing and identifying new 'symbols of revolution'?" In his interview with a nine-year-old Palestinian girl,

Tyszko said that the girl once wished to be a doctor, but now that she could no longer study or sleep at night, she wanted to be a martyr. Tyszko, inspired by this conversational exchange, made banalized violence an art in the West. The young girl had “effectively bought the notion of suicide bombing as a lifestyle choice—it has become aspirational, an off the shelf peer led option.” Tyszko’s Barbie confronts the absurdity of the original suicide bomber doll by symbolizing violence that became habitus.⁷⁴ Tyszko also seems to have rekindled an earlier controversy about the photograph of a baby bomber found in Hebron. The child is shown in this photograph wearing the outfit of a Hamas suicide bomber, with belts holding bullets and bombs, and the red bandanna of the well-recognized soldier-martyr.⁷⁵

As humans, the “pang of conscience” is that we may be human, we may be weak, and we may actually sin.⁷⁶ It is through our conscience that we become aware that we can sin; our conscience guides us, and it encourages us to reject the urge to punish and destroy. Nietzsche says that the conscience made humans responsible and that this is a late but significant fruit. In defense of the soldier-martyr, he actually ruptures the “pang of conscience” on many levels, but not without grievous effects. There is a measure of calm detachment, quiet arrogance, cool calculation, and total certainty attached to an act of suicide violence. The soldier-martyr calculates, but not in deference to the calculations of his conscience; his calculation instead benefits individual and group interests. The soldier-martyr shuts off the conscience by means of this overconfidence, so to speak (some would say by way of his religious certainty): of course, in his mind, the soldier-martyr who strikes innocent life is assured that he is committing a noble self-sacrifice and that his sacrifice is naturally to counteract the injustice perpetrated against those he identifies with; he walks the higher moral ground and is not the cause of a further injustice; and he sees lofty illusions of martyrdom as fulfilling a personal narrative to have lived a noble life and to have died an idealized death.⁷⁷ Confronting banalized violence is about tracking down how a succession of violent acts can destroy collective memory, conscience, and recognition of Otherness and destroy the capacity for answerability.

Conclusion

Arendt often argued that what makes men and women political beings is their capacity to act.⁷⁸ She ascribed particular importance to the ancient Greek conception of act, which meant both governing and beginning.⁷⁹ To act means to set something in motion, to begin not just something new but also oneself as that being that acts to begin itself.⁸⁰ The **fact** is that we are beings endowed with the capacity to act (or, as Sartre would say, “to be is to act”) and that to act is to realize a rupture in the given; to act always means to enact the unexpected and unpredictable.⁸¹ As Arendt would put it, “[T]he human heart is the only thing in the world that will take upon itself the burden that the divine gift

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of action, of being a beginning and therefore being able to make a beginning, has placed upon us.”⁸² We have elaborated an argument that suicide violence against domination, oppression, injustice, and abjection, however justifiable as original and radical, loses its character as an act when it becomes routine, or as Arendt would say about violence in general, it becomes most irrational when it becomes rationalized.⁸³ Two very important aspects of the banalization of suicide violence are the means-turned-ends shift, in which the goal of liberation is subordinated by the goal of bloodshed, and the everyday quality of the act, in which the daily practice of detonating bombs has become prosaic and mimetic. Thus, we concluded, suicide violence is no longer an act, a beginning, but habitus. We briefly addressed how indifference, panoptic judgments, and totalizing devaluations of the Other have banalized and normalized suicide violence, and how such effects and affects are also realized in their systematization, routinization, rationalization, and glorification.

It is an ethical impossibility for actors to evade the responsibility that is afforded to them as acting and choosing beings by arguing that constraining contingencies and the pressure from their groups, for example, gave them no other choice but to self-annihilate and take a few dozen people with them. This is an ethical impossibility despite the inherent complicity of the founding violence of states in creating the conditions for suicide violence to flourish in the first place. An aporia of freedom vis-à-vis suicide violence is that it is not created in a vacuum (e.g., the acts of Others often create the conditions for violence), and yet, in the end, it is the actor who is still radically responsible for choices he makes.

We ought not to consider soldier-martyrs as “dupes or mechanisms of an impersonal social force, but actors with responsibility.”⁸⁴ Yet, when acts of suicide violence are transformed into habitus and become embodied in the body politic, it will be almost impossible to restore its qualities as an act. This mimetic logic that becomes embedded as habitus continually produces a compulsion for repetition. Robson spoke of “[t]his compulsion to repeat, to repeat acts of suicide, to replicate a suicidal state such that it becomes a global suicidal state.”⁸⁵ The repercussions of this create a neurosis of the body politic and of the citizen through which the fear of repetition creates more repetition.⁸⁶ The “War on Terror” and suicide violence become two aspects of the same cycle of repetition that produces the neurotic citizen.⁸⁷

Acknowledgments

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Notes

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page 30.

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9. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking Press, 1963).
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11. Two more recent and notable examples are David Campbell and Michael Dillon, eds., *The Political Subject of Violence* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993); and John Keane, *Violence and Democracy, Contemporary Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Both discuss the prominent figures and issues in the debate.
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 25. *Ibid.*
 26. Adolf Reinach, "The Apriori Foundations of Civil Law" (1913), reprinted in *Aletheia* 3 (1983): 1–142.
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 28. Sartre, "Being and Doing."
 29. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Freedom and Command," in his *Collected Philosophical Papers* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 25.
 30. Sartre, "Being and Doing," 482.
 31. Soldier-martyrs do not create themselves; the blank-slate baby does not just become a bomber, although many mothers now dream that the child in their wombs will be a martyr and will therefore die a martyr's death.
 32. Sartre, "Being and Doing," 482–509. We understand empathetically that many people live in terribly suffocating conditions, and have their land stolen and their homes destroyed, but we emphatically reject the claim that this gives them no other option than to engage in routinized suicide violence.
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 34. *Ibid.*, 534.
 35. *Ibid.*, 540.
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 39. Max Weber, "Basis Sociological Terms," 14.
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41. Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, 64.
42. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 80, 102–3.
43. *Ibid.*, 93.
44. Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, 2–3.
45. *Ibid.*, 41–42.
46. *Ibid.*, 31.
47. *Ibid.*, 27.
48. Sartre, “Being and Doing,” 431.
49. *Ibid.*, 432.
50. Arendt, *On Violence*, 51.
51. *Ibid.*, 4.
52. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 12.
53. Esslin, *The Theatre of the Absurd*, 4–5; see also Emmanuel Lévinas, *Alterity and Transcendence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
54. Arendt, *On Violence*, 79–81.
55. Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, 55.
56. *Ibid.*, 31.
57. Esslin, *The Theatre of the Absurd*, 31.
58. The formula for many soldier-martyrs is the following: martyrdom is near guaranteed when one strikes the infidel with solid faith in the unity of God. Of course, who the “infidel” is is the subject of arbitrary specifications; the infidel can be a non-Muslim, an atheist, a combatant or occupying force, and even a member of another religious sect.
59. Lévinas, “Freedom and Command,” 19.
60. Pierre Hayat, “Introduction,” in Lévinas, *Alterity and Transcendence*, xiii.
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67. Arendt, *On Violence*, 64.
68. Soldier-martyrs place profound emphasis on the exoteric aspects of religion including religious doctrine and jurisprudence, though the majority are lacking in the formal education of these sciences.
69. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 201.
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73. *Ibid.*, 122–25.
74. See Simon Tyzsko, “Suicide Bomber Barbie,” <http://www.theculture.net/barbie/>.
75. See Mark Robson, “The Baby Bomber,” *Journal of Visual Culture* 31, no. 1 (2004): 63–76.
76. Friedrich Nietzsche, “Second Essay: ‘Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience’ and Related Matters,” in his *On the Genealogy of Morals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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79. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 177; and Arendt, “Understanding and Politics,” 321.
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82. Arendt, “Understanding and Politics,” 322.
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85. Robson, “The Baby Bomber,” 71.
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